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LETTING THE PERFECT BECOME THE ENEMY OF THE GOOD:
THE RELATEDNESS PROBLEM IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION
by
Robin J. Effron∗
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in J. McIntyre Machinery v.
Nicastro had the potential to resolve nearly two decades of confusion in
personal jurisdiction doctrine. Confronted with the earlier Asahi plurality
opinions, which had established competing “stream of commerce” theories,
the Court produced a fractured 4–2–3 opinion that resolved little beyond
holding that the New Jersey courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction
over the defendant in the instant case.
In this Article, I consider one dimension of the doctrinal deadlock that the
Supreme Court produced in Nicastro: the concept of specific jurisdiction
itself. In recent cases, most notably in Nicastro, the Court has become
obsessed with the general and abstract contours of the relationship between a
defendant and the forum state. However, one of the most important aspects
of the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction is the relatedness
between the lawsuit and the forum state. In conceptualizing relatedness at
the highest level of generality, the Supreme Court has characterized the
relatedness problem in a way that is nearly impossible to answer in any
concrete case that comes before it. In other words, the Supreme Court has let
the perfect become the enemy of the good. Instead of producing a flexible,
workable, if not entirely global or perfect rule, the Court has given the lower
courts hardly any rule at all.
This Article suggests that in order to break the stream of commerce stalemate,
the Supreme Court should refocus specific jurisdiction doctrine so that it
produces concrete answers to the two dimensions of the relatedness problem. It
further argues that Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce position from
Asahi remains the most viable path for specific jurisdiction analysis. The
expansive scope of the Brennan position fits well with modern
understandings of commerce and the domestic and international sale and
distribution of goods. Moreover, in tandem with a robust fairness analysis,
the stream of commerce position will allow courts to examine the two
dimensions of relatedness in a useful, concrete, and doctrinally consistent
manner.
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II.
III.

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in J. McIntyre Machinery v.
1
Nicastro had the potential to resolve nearly two decades of confusion in
2
personal jurisdiction doctrine. Confronted with the earlier Asahi
plurality opinions, which had established competing “stream of
commerce” theories, the Court produced a fractured 4–2–3 opinion that
resolved little beyond holding that the New Jersey courts could not
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the instant case. The
academic community met the Nicastro decision with almost unanimous
disapproval, decrying the Court’s inability to resolve the stream of
commerce theory in particular and to articulate a coherent theory of
3
personal jurisdiction in general. The fuzziness between general and
specific jurisdiction, as well as the uncertainties in each of these doctrines
1

131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
3
See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the
Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2011)
(“The Supreme Court performed miserably. Its opinion in J. McIntyre . . . is a
disaster.”); Allan Ides, Foreword: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 344–46, 358–62, 367–
69, 386–87 (2012) (The opinions “exacerbated rather than ameliorated the doctrinal
confusion.”); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear
and McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 241–42 (2011) (“[T]he cases may serve to
increase the confusion of the lower courts about the requirements for establishing
both general and specific jurisdiction.”); Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land:
Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV.
481, 515 (2012) (calling the “lack of a majority opinion” in Nicastro “disappointing”).
2

Do Not Delete

2012]

7/15/2012 4:40 PM

THE RELATEDNESS PROBLEM

869

themselves can be attributed to a lack of a coherent theory underlying
4
the exercise of personal jurisdiction at all. In this Article, I join the
chorus of critics and suggest that we might shed new light on this debate
by revisiting an old concept—specific jurisdiction—and that to fully
understand the quandary of specific jurisdiction, we must look outside of
personal jurisdiction itself.
The critiques leveled against the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional
jurisprudence are well-known: that the doctrine is fuzzy, malleable, and
highly case specific, and that the Court has been either unable or
unwilling to provide a comprehensive and coherent legal and political
theory underlying the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants
5
in a forum state. This doctrinal confusion culminated in the Nicastro
case, with Justices who could not command a majority and an opinion
that communicates very little in the way of useful information to lower
courts and future litigants.
In this Article, I consider one dimension of why Nicastro has resulted
in decision paralysis at the Supreme Court: the concept of specific
jurisdiction itself. When Nicastro is considered alongside its companion
6
case, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, a picture of the
problems caused by an under-theorized doctrine of specific jurisdiction

4

See, e.g., Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?, 46
RUTGERS L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1994) (“[Personal jurisdiction doctrine] is a body of law
whose purpose is uncertain, whose rules and standards seem incapable of
clarification, and whose connection to the Constitution cannot easily be divined.”);
Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1027
(1995) (“American jurisdictional law is a mess. . . . [The Court is unable] to devise a
satisfactory approach to the simple question of where a civil action may be
brought.”); Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C.
L. REV. 529, 532 (1991) (“Until we finally identify the underlying problem for which
personal jurisdiction is the solution, the doctrinal muddle will persist.”); Todd David
Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 101 (2010)
(“[The Supreme Court has been unable] to enunciate a coherent theory of precisely
why the Due Process Clause imposes limitations on the states’ exercises of personal
jurisdiction.”); Peterson, supra note 3, at 241 (“[T]he cases may serve to increase the
confusion of the lower courts about the requirements for establishing both general
and specific jurisdiction.”).
5
See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a
Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1998) (“Ambiguity and
incoherence have plagued the minimum contacts test . . . .”); Perdue, supra note 4, at
530 (“[E]very few years, the Court’s description of personal jurisdiction is
inconsistent with its recent prior precedent.”); Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal
Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 850 (1989) (“[T]he
Supreme Court . . . has failed to expound a coherent theory of the limits of state
sovereignty over noncitizens or aliens.”). See generally Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s
Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971 (2009); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and
Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112 (1981).
6
131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
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emerges. The puzzles of general and specific jurisdiction are not new,
but the extent to which they have wreaked havoc in recent jurisprudence
underscores the need to resolve these difficulties in a speedy and orderly
fashion.
In recent cases, most notably in Nicastro, the Court has become
obsessed with the general and abstract contours of the relationship
8
between a defendant and the forum state. However, one of the most
important aspects of the distinction between general and specific
jurisdiction is an examination of the relatedness between the lawsuit and
9
the forum state.
When viewed from the perspective of relatedness, the problem of
specific jurisdiction is a variant of other procedural puzzles that all seek
to answer the same question: How common is common enough? This
question is woven through procedural doctrines involving joinder,
aggregate litigation, amendment of pleadings, and subject matter
jurisdiction, and is notoriously difficult to answer. In conceptualizing
relatedness at the highest level of generality, the Supreme Court has let
the perfect become the enemy of the good. Instead of producing a
flexible, workable, if not entirely global or perfect rule, the Court has
given the lower courts hardly any rule at all.
The relatedness inquiry can and should be tied to the underlying
purpose of the procedural device. In other words, the relatedness inquiry
is most successful when the perfect has not become the enemy of the
good, and the good is tied to sound procedural purposes. In earlier work,
I have criticized the jurisprudence of relatedness and commonality in
10
doctrines such as joinder. My claim there is that courts are overly
focused on factual specificity and insufficiently attentive to the purpose
11
that the concept of relatedness serves. The issue in personal jurisdiction
presents a mirror image of that problem: with such an intense focus on
competing theories of jurisdiction, courts and scholars have been
inattentive to the role that factual relatedness to the lawsuit can and
should play in the jurisdictional inquiry.
The divide between general and specific jurisdiction, and the
reluctance to engage with specific jurisdiction on its own terms provides
one explanation for the startling gap between the fractured Nicastro
decision and the unanimous and clearly reasoned opinion in Goodyear.
The gulf between these two cases suggests that the Court is perfectly
capable of developing theories and rules of personal jurisdiction when
7

See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1444 (1988); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV.
610 (1988).
8
See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787–89 (2011).
9
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9
(1984); Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994).
10
See generally Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 759 (2012).
11
Id. at 789.
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one dimension of the problem of relatedness is removed from the
picture. Assuming, then, that specific jurisdiction is founded on sound
constitutional and conceptual grounds, the challenge for the future is to
fashion a jurisprudence of relatedness that can function in harmony with
the underlying theories of personal jurisdiction, rather than obscuring
them. Moreover, when the “fuzziness” of jurisdictional doctrine is
attributed to relatedness rather than to the underlying power of the
sovereign itself, the Court might find itself less paralyzed by the fear of
drawing the Due Process line in the “right” place, and instead be willing
to deliver clear rules of personal jurisdiction that give better direction to
litigants and lower courts.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I traces the history of
personal jurisdiction through the lense of the relatedness problem, and
argues that the Court has elided the two dimensions of the relatedness
problem—the relationship between the defendant and the forum, and
the relationship between the lawsuit and the forum—in a way that has
made some specific jurisdiction cases nearly impossible to answer. It then
delivers a detailed critique of the Nicastro opinion and the Court’s failure
to articulate a majority opinion, and contrasts it with the deceptively easy
and unanimous Goodyear opinion.
Part II offers further reflections on how a sharper focus on the
relationship of the lawsuit to the forum can help to move the Court
beyond its decision paralysis. First, this Part argues some procedural
doctrines, such as joinder and personal jurisdiction, are not successful
when they are framed in terms generalized abstract relatedness
questions. It then argues that Nicastro’s failure can be attributed, at least
in part, to this problem. This Part then suggests that the path away from
decision paralysis must include a commitment by the Supreme Court to
avoid framing the personal jurisdiction problem in terms of abstract
relatedness.
Part III revisits the concept of nationwide contacts that are inclusive
of a forum state and argues that it remains the best path toward a
coherent and consistent specific jurisdiction doctrine. This Part further
argues that adopting the “nationwide contacts” view espoused by Justice
Ginsburg in her Nicastro dissent might be the best way forward, but that it
is possible only when seen as a proper and limited consequence of the
exercise of specific jurisdiction. Far from being an unwieldy and
overbroad doctrine, nationwide contacts function appropriately in
stream of commerce cases because they are limited by the concept of
specific jurisdiction which ties the lawsuit specifically to the forum, rather
than the defendant generally. Moreover, if Justice Brennan’s vision from
Asahi is revived and invigorated, the fairness factors from World-Wide
12
Volkswagen can guard against the excessive exercises of jurisdiction. In
addition to putting appropriate limitations on unfair exercises of

12

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
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jurisdiction, the fairness factors can be construed so as to encourage an
examination of the question of the defendant’s relatedness to the forum,
thus ensuring that courts consider both aspects of relatedness in a
concrete manner.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND DECISION PARALYSIS
In this Part, I argue that the Supreme Court has reached a point of
decision paralysis in personal jurisdiction doctrine and that this paralysis
will continue so long as the Court searches for a definitive answer to the
relatedness problem. I do not mean to suggest that the relatedness
problem is the only source of trouble plaguing personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence. Plenty of ideological and theoretical hurdles stand
between the doctrine as it currently stands and a coherent articulation of
personal jurisdiction standards. A closer look at the relatedness problem,
however, will move the debate forward in a healthy way.
A. The Relatedness Problem and the Path to the Stream of Commerce Crisis
The relatedness problem in personal jurisdiction has two
dimensions. First, there is the problem of the relationship between the
defendant and the forum state. Second, there is the problem of the
relationship between the lawsuit and the forum state. Although these two
problems are interconnected, they form distinct analytical categories.
Unfortunately, many judges and commentators do not treat them as
such. Instead, relatedness is an open and fluid category in which judges
slip back and forth between comments about the relationship between a
defendant and the forum and comments about the relationship between
the lawsuit and the forum. Treating the relatedness problem as a broad
13
and vague category is not a successful strategy for procedural questions.
The Nicastro and Goodyear opinions are the latest chapter in the
development of personal jurisdiction doctrine. Detailed and thorough
14
histories of personal jurisdiction abound; thus, my aim here is to situate
the reader in the context of the latest jurisprudence.
1. Specific Jurisdiction and the Divergence of Categories of Relatedness
The journey to decision paralysis began in 1945 with International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, in which the Supreme Court announced that an
out of state corporation could be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
13

See infra Part II.A (discussing the relatedness problem in joinder).
See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The
Ironic Influence of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551 (2012); Sean K. Hornbeck,
Comment, Transnational Litigation and Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Defendants, 59
ALB. L. REV. 1389 (1996); Perdue, supra note 4; William M. Richman, Understanding
Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599 (1993); Flavio Rose, Related Contacts and
Personal Jurisdiction: The “But For” Test, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1545, 1546–52 (1994); A.
Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617,
620–25 (2006).
14
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forum state if it had “certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play
15
and substantial justice.’”
International Shoe contained the seeds of both general and specific
jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction involves jurisdiction over parties whose
16
contact with the forum state is related to the lawsuit. General
jurisdiction, on the other hand, is “dispute-blind” meaning that a court of
a forum state may exercise jurisdiction over any claim against a party
regardless of the relationship of the party’s contacts with the forum state
17
and the lawsuit at hand. The Court in International Shoe did not specify
whether the facts of that case supported general or specific jurisdiction,
suggesting at some points that Washington State could exercise
jurisdiction over the company because of its “systematic and continuous”
activities in the state, but at other times that jurisdiction was fair because
18
the lawsuit itself “arose out of those very activities.”
The ambiguity between general and specific jurisdiction in
International Shoe was understandable. The “general” and “specific”
terminology itself did not even come into usage until 1966 when
Professors von Mehren and Trautman coined the terms in a law review
19
article. International Shoe contained enough of a revolution, dispensing
20
as it did with the fiction of physical presence in the forum state, and
kicking off the modern constitutional requirement of minimum contacts
21
for long-arm jurisdiction. It would thus be unfair to accuse the Court of
decision paralysis this early in the modern era of personal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court cases in the decades following International Shoe
produced the now-familiar vocabulary of minimum contacts, an arsenal
15

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
16
See id. at 317–19; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472
(1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 & nn.8–9
(1984).
17
Twitchell, supra note 7, at 613.
18
Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320.
19
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136–37 (1966).
20
Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316–17 (“[T]he terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used
merely to symbolize those activities . . . which courts will deem to be sufficient to
satisfy the demands of due process.”); see also Eric C. Hawkins, Note, General
Jurisdiction and Internet Contacts: What Role, if Any, Should the Zippo Sliding Scale
Test Play in the Analysis?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV 2371, 2373 n.15 (2006) (“The Court
moved away from the legal fiction of the ‘presence’ requirement, reasoning that a
measurement of the defendant’s activities in the forum could take its place.”);
Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. REV 753,
762–63 (2003) (“[A]fter rejecting the old ‘presence’ test . . . the Court . . . create[d] a
brand-new test for a major area of the law . . . .”); Peterson, supra note 4, at 107 (“In
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a much more
flexible standard for analyzing personal jurisdiction, but one that was still linked to
the Due Process Clause.” (footnote omitted)).
21
See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
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of words including “purposeful availment,” “targeting” the forum state,
24
25
“foreseeability,” and a fairness vocabulary of burdens and benefits.
Although the constitutional underpinnings of personal jurisdiction lie in
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the
Court produced an ever-shifting definition of this right, stating
26
sometimes that it is grounded in “interstate federalism” and at others
27
that it is “a matter of individual liberty.”
During these years, the specter of relatedness haunted personal
28
jurisdiction jurisprudence. Although the Court did not adopt the von
29
Mehren and Trautman terminology until the 1980s, the premise of
30
specific jurisdiction grounded much of the Court’s jurisprudence. This
proved relatively unproblematic when there was a tight one-to-one
connection between the relationship of the defendant to the forum and
the relationship of the lawsuit to the forum. In International Shoe itself, for
example, the defendant’s contacts with Washington State (selling shoes
via independent salesman) were intimately connected with the lawsuit
(whether the state could recover unpaid contributions to an
31
unemployment fund for the activities of those salesmen). Likewise, the
defendant in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. had a single contact
with the State of California, sending an insurance contract to a California
32
resident, and it was upon that contract that the lawsuit was based.
22

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003); Toys
“R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003).
24
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 476 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 297 (1980).
25
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and conurring in the judgment); Burger King Corp.,
471 U.S. at 476; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292; see also Linda S.
Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual
Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323, 368 (1992) (“[T]he Court gradually and
fatefully slid into the now well-known concepts and vocabulary [of personal
jurisdiction].”).
26
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 294.
27
Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982); see also Borchers, supra note 3, at 1246–47; Richman, supra note 14, at 606–07.
But see Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1589, 1591 (1992) (noting the different constitutional sources of personal
jurisdiction limitations); Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due
Process Through the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 415 (2004)
(defending Ins. Corp. of Ireland as consistent with interstate federalism concerns);
Trangsrud, supra note 5, at 896–98.
28
See Spencer, supra note 14, at 618 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence has done “more to confuse and complicate the doctrine
than Professors von Mehren and Trautman had done to clarify it”).
29
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 (1984).
30
Id. at 414.
31
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
32
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
23
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Therefore, in cases like McGee and International Shoe there was little need
to discuss the type of relatedness grounding jurisdiction because there
was no obvious divergence between the relatedness of the defendant to
the forum and the relatedness of the lawsuit to the forum.
The concept began to unravel, however, in cases where the two
33
relatedness dimensions did not correspond as neatly. In World-Wide
Volkswagen, for example, the relationship between the lawsuit and the
forum was fairly high, while the relationship between two of the
defendants and the forum was very low. The plaintiffs had sued the car
manufacturer, distributors, and dealership in Oklahoma where the
34
devastating accident had taken place. Two defendants challenged
personal jurisdiction: the dealer, which was incorporated and located in
New York, and the regional distributor, which was located in New York
and sold cars and associated parts to retail dealers in New York,
Connecticut, and New Jersey. Neither defendant had contacts with the
forum state beyond any vehicles sold in the tri-state area and brought to
35
Oklahoma by other individuals.
In its opinion, the World-Wide Volkswagen Court chose the
relationship between the defendant and the forum as the dominant lens
36
through which to view the jurisdictional problem. The relationship
between the lawsuit and the forum, however, makes a few guest
appearances in the opinion, turning up as an interest that the plaintiff
might have in choosing her forum or the forum state might have in
37
exercising jurisdiction over particular incidents.
It is no wonder that courts and commentators parsing the decision
had trouble pinning down its precise meaning. Surely the relationship
between the lawsuit and the forum must be of some relevance. Otherwise
the Court could have dispensed with the specific jurisdiction analysis
entirely and conducted a straightforward general jurisdiction analysis of
World-Wide Volkswagen’s and Seaway’s connection to Oklahoma with no
reference to the auto accident in question. However, having assumed
that the relationship between the lawsuit and the forum state was of some
unspecified relevance to the jurisdictional inquiry, the opinion appears
33

See Bloom, supra note 5, at 985 (“[T]his prescribed approach has grown
elaborate, even convoluted in parts. Its ‘general’ and ‘specific’ options are saddled
with multiple layers, overlapping features, and ‘accumulat[ed]’ supplements.”
(alteration in original) (quoting McMunigal, supra note 5, at 195)).
34
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980).
35
Id. at 288–89.
36
Id. at 295.
37
There is a rich academic debate regarding the scope of this interest,
questioning whether the state’s interest is an ex ante regulatory interest in certain
types of activity, or a more specific ex post interest in resolving disputes with strong ties
to the forum. See Stein, supra note 27, at 420–29; Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 1449; see
also Stein, supra note 27, at 434 (describing a “regulatory precision” theory that would
“consider the impact of [a court’s] assertion of jurisdiction on the allocation of
authority nationally and internationally”).
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to leave open the possibility that the defendants might have been subject
to jurisdiction in some other foreign forum, albeit one closer to their
homes in New York, perhaps in the other two “tri-state” region states of
Connecticut and New Jersey, or a bordering state such as Pennsylvania.
In other words, by blending the two problems of relatedness, the Court
teed up the stream of commerce problems in the most problematic of
relatedness terms: How close is close enough?
2. General Jurisdiction and the Uneasy Absence of a Lawsuit-Relatedness
Paradigm
Meanwhile, the Court’s consideration of general jurisdiction cases
did little to advance the analytical ball. The Court has entertained far
38
more specific jurisdiction cases than general jurisdiction cases, and the
line between the two concepts looks especially blurry in light of the fact
that the Supreme Court heard very few “true” general jurisdiction cases
39
prior to Goodyear. In 1984, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
40
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol). This case was a
curious choice as a vehicle for general jurisdiction analysis because many
of the defendant Helicol’s contacts with the forum state of Texas were
connected to the contract for the sale of helicopters that ultimately
resulted in an accident in Peru, but the Court refrained from discussing
41
the meaning of any potential relatedness. The Court lurched forward
with its conclusion that Helicol did not conduct the sort of systematic and
42
continuous activity necessary for general jurisdiction, but the awkward
fact of the relatedness of the defendant’s contacts with the lawsuit
43
clouded the clarity and utility of the opinion. In the same year the
Court decided Helicol, Professor Richman described specific and general
jurisdiction as a sliding scale in which, “[a]s the quantity and quality of
38
See Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 119, 129 (“[T]he Supreme Court has decided more specific [than general]
jurisdiction cases in recent years.”).
39
See id. at 123–26 (recounting the rare instances of “true” general jurisdiction
cases and noting that “[the Supreme Court’s general jurisdiction cases each had]
special circumstances that limit the explanatory value of the majority opinion”); see
also Twitchell, supra note 7, at 635. This was also true of lower court cases. See Rose,
supra note 14, at 1557–58.
40
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
41
The Texas Supreme Court limited its inquiry to interpretation of the State’s
long-arm general jurisdiction statute. Thus, the Supreme Court considered only the
general jurisdiction basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 413 n.7.
42
Id. at 415–16.
43
See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction
Doctrine: A Case Study on the Effects of a “Generally” Too Broad, but “Specifically” Too Narrow
Approach to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 149–54 (2005) (discussing
Helicol and the dispute-blind nature of general jurisdiction); see also Stein, supra note
27, at 440 (discussing similar problems with lower court opinions and noting that
“additional connections between the claim and the forum . . . might have rendered
jurisdiction appropriate under a specific jurisdiction framework, and the courts
would have been well advised to limit their holdings to those circumstances”).
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the defendant’s forum contacts increase, a weaker connection between
the plaintiff’s claim and those contacts is permissible; as the quantity and
quality of the defendant’s forum contacts decrease, a stronger
connection between the plaintiff’s claim and those contacts is
44
required.” However, the lack of direct engagement with the relationship
between the claim and the contacts resulted in the clumsy formalism of
Helicol and jurisprudentially unsatisfying World-Wide Volkswagen.
Professor Twitchell told a different story of Helicol, identifying a
45
doctrine of “conditional general jurisdiction.” According to Twitchell,
courts supposedly deciding cases under a general jurisdiction framework
had actually been considering the relatedness of the contacts to the
46
lawsuit. The Helicol case, Twitchell argued, set firmer limits on the
exercise of general jurisdiction, particularly in cases where the contacts
47
do appear to have some relationship to the cause of action. Thus, “[b]y
clarifying the limits of general jurisdiction, the Court has signaled to the
lower courts that they cannot continue to use general jurisdiction
48
concepts to shield what are essentially claim-related evaluations.”
However, if tightening the limits of general jurisdiction was supposed to
shift attention to the difficult and unresolved foundations and limits of
specific jurisdiction, one wonders what went wrong in the years following
Helicol, one wonders about the utility of the sliding scale in a world in
which courts only sometimes give serious and separate consideration to
the relationship between the forum contacts and the lawsuit. In other
words, “general jurisdiction’s problems are at least partly about specific
jurisdiction; sensible and predictable bases of general jurisdiction should
49
cause no difficulty.”
While general jurisdiction theoretically should have focused courts’
attention entirely on the relationship of the defendant to the forum with
no mention of the relationship of the lawsuit to the forum, it did not do
so. Instead, the muddled relatedness analysis in general jurisdiction was
emblematic of the overall neglect of the nuances of relatedness
categories in personal jurisdiction.
3. The Relatedness Problem Produces the Stream of Commerce Crisis
Given these doctrinal and theoretical difficulties, it came as little
surprise that by the late 1980s the Court was “having difficulty generating
50
majority opinions.” The stream of commerce cases were a lightning rod
44
William M. Richman, Review Essay, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1328, 1345 (1984)
(reviewing ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS (1983)).
45
Twitchell, supra note 7, at 650–52.
46
Id. at 635.
47
Id. at 651–52.
48
Id. at 652.
49
Borchers, supra note 38, at 119.
50
Perdue, supra note 4, at 530; see also Stein, supra note 27, at 433 (“The courts
have been struggling for years outside the Internet context to refine the meaning of
purposeful availment.”).
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for the problems of personal jurisdiction. Placing an item in the stream
that is eventually used or sold in the forum state is undoubtedly a contact
with the forum, but a question remained over whether that contact meets
the constitutional threshold of a minimum contact. These troubles
51
culminated in the 1987 Asahi decision. The plaintiff in Asahi was injured
in a motorcycle accident in California and alleged that the accident was
caused by a defect in the rear tire. He sued Cheng Shin, the Taiwanese
tire manufacturer. Cheng Shin then impleaded Asahi, a Japanese
corporation that manufactured a valve used in the tire. The plaintiff
settled his suit with Cheng Shin, so that only Cheng Shin’s lawsuit against
Asahi remained, and Asahi challenged the California court’s
52
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court held 9–0 that California lacked personal
jurisdiction over Asahi. But, as any first-year law student knows, looks are
deceiving, and the Court did not deliver a majority opinion as to the
reasoning behind the judgment. The two major plurality opinions, each
garnering four votes, set the terms of the argument as a debate between
53
the “stream of commerce” and “stream of commerce plus” doctrines.
Under Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce doctrine, a defendant
manufacturer has minimum contacts with the forum state if its products
54
reach the forum state through a “chain of distribution” and the “regular
and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to
55
retail sale.” Asahi represented a special case in which jurisdiction would
be contrary to “fair play and substantial justice” because the burden on
Asahi was particularly high and the interests of the original plaintiff and
56
the forum state were unusually low.
Justice O’Connor, on the other hand, introduced the “stream of
commerce plus” doctrine. Simply placing manufactured items that might
foreseeably reach the forum state in the stream of commerce does not a
minimum contact make. A defendant must target or “purposefully
57
direct” its conduct toward the forum state. Despite “Asahi’s awareness
that some of the valves sold to Cheng Shin would be incorporated into
tire tubes [in motorcycles] sold in California,” Asahi had not
“purposefully avail[ed] itself of the California market,” and therefore did
58
not have minimum contacts with the state.
51

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
Id. at 105–07.
53
Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (stream of commerce plus); id. at
117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stream of
commerce). A third position, Justice Stevens’ volume–value theory, was difficult to
discern and never gained much traction in the lower courts. See id. at 121–22
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
54
Id. at 120 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
55
Id. at 117.
56
Id. at 116.
57
Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
58
Id.
52
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59

Post-Asahi, the lower courts did their best to sort out the doctrine.
Not only did courts need to choose between the two competing
60
doctrines, but the contours of the doctrines themselves required more
definition. Further complicating matters, these problems and splits
increased with the development of the Internet, which provided new
61
iterations of older problems. Disagreements arose as to whether the
stream of commerce or the stream of commerce plus doctrines applied
62
to fully manufactured goods or component parts; what role sales
63
through a distributor should play; whether the product sold was
64
considered “hazardous,” or what should happen if a plaintiff buys a
product in one forum and then is injured in another forum in which the
65
product is also sold. Courts and commentators also questioned whether

59
See Peterson, supra note 3, at 207–10 (providing a history of the stream of
commerce doctrines).
60
Compare Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 479–
80 (6th Cir. 2003) (adopting the O’Connor stream of commerce plus test), with
Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding the Brennan
stream of commerce test is “determinative”).
61
See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 38, at 128 (“With the rise of e-commerce to multibillion dollar proportions, and as interstate and international transactions over the
Internet become increasingly common and nearly frictionless, the radical
indeterminacy of American jurisdictional principles is a major problem.” (footnote
omitted)); Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the
Internet, and the Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575, 586–600
(1998) (“Whether one can find consistency in the lower court’s treatment of
jurisdiction and the Internet is debatable.”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the
Internet: Returning to Traditional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 71, 73 (“The advent and extensive use of the Internet have presented new
challenges for the law of personal jurisdiction.”). But see Stein, supra note 27, at 411
(“My position is that the Internet does not pose unique jurisdictional challenges.”).
62
Compare Hoffpauir v. Linde Lift Truck Corp., No. 03-CV-1279, 2007 WL
963187, at *3 (W.D. La. Mar. 28, 2007) (applying stream of commerce doctrine to
nonresident component manufacturers), and Pegasus Helicopters, Inc. v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 954 F. Supp. 218, 220 (D. Colo. 1997) (same), with Stanton v. St. Jude
Med., Inc., 340 F.3d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 2003) (requiring purposeful availment for
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident component manufacturer).
63
See Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 615 (8th
Cir. 1994) (sale of products through a distributor does not prevent finding of specific
jurisdiction); Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 544 (6th Cir. 1993)
(use of a national distributor with other evidence of purposeful availment sufficient
for specific jurisdiction); DeMoss v. City Mkt., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 913, 919 (D. Utah
1991) (some evidence of purposeful availment, is necessary, “but it need not be
direct”); see also Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 554–55 (1995) (describing the pre- and post-Asahi “parade of
horribles” in which manufacturers can insulate themselves from liability behind
“layers of independent distributors”).
64
See Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 494 (11th Cir. 1988).
65
Parry v. Ernst Home Ctr. Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 660–61 (Utah 1989).

Do Not Delete

880

7/15/2012 4:40 PM

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:3

either of the stream of commerce doctrines should apply to both specific
66
and general jurisdiction cases.
Asahi thus failed to give much guidance for how to answer the
question, How close is close enough? At one level, the disagreement
among the justices reflects a disagreement over the permissible scope of
attenuation. For Justice Brennan, placing an item in the stream of
commerce that will foreseeably end up in the forum state is sufficiently
related for purposes of personal jurisdiction, whereas Justice O’Connor
67
(and, to a certain extent, Justice Stevens ) were looking for a closer
relationship. From this vantage point, the stream of commerce argument
is a disagreement about degree. Those looking for an answer to the
question, How related is related enough? in Asahi might believe that the
answer is to be found somewhere on a continuum of relatedness between
the Brennan and O’Connor’s positions.
On a deeper level, however, Asahi underscores a larger conflict about
the dimensions of the relatedness problem. Justice O’Connor’s “stream
of commerce plus” doctrine calls for a generalized relatedness inquiry, in
which the various aspects of the defendants relationship to the forum
and the lawsuit’s relationship to the forum are amalgamated so that at a
certain point they cross the threshold from too attenuated to sufficiently
related. Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce theory, on the other
hand, sets out a framework in which different aspects of the relatedness
inquiry can be disaggregated. Assuming that the forum state is the place
of injury, the foreseeability prong of the Brennan doctrine provides a
clear answer to the question of how closely related the lawsuit must be to
the forum state. However, the fairness prong of Brennan’s personal
jurisdiction doctrine recognizes that the second relatedness dimension of
the connection between the defendant and the forum state can be
addressed separately, as a part of the fairness analysis.
Even on this understanding, none of the Justices explicitly identified
the two dimensions of relatedness of playing distinct and complementary
roles, particularly in specific jurisdiction analysis. Instead, the lack of
agreement exacerbated the need to resolve the stream of commerce
problem itself, and the problem of personal jurisdiction increasingly
became a problem of relatedness.
B. The Stream of Commerce Comes to the 21st Century: Nicastro and Goodyear
After nearly two decades of silence from the Supreme Court, the
68
69
legal community awaited the Nicastro and Goodyear decisions with

66
See Peterson, supra note 3, at 213 n.73 (citing general jurisdiction cases based
on direct sales into the forum state).
67
Justice Stevens wrote an opaque concurrence in Asahi promulgating a
“volume–value” theory of personal jurisdiction. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court., 480 U.S. 102, 121 (1987).
68
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
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baited breath, hoping for a more definitive resolution to the stream of
commerce problem. The collective disappointment in the Court’s
70
opinions in these cases was immediately palpable.
Nicastro and Goodyear were both products liability cases where the
respective state courts premised personal jurisdiction on stream of
commerce theories. The plaintiff in Nicastro, a New Jersey metal worker
named Robert Nicastro, severely injured his hand while operating one of
J. McIntyre Machinery’s metal-shearing machines. He sued J. McIntyre in
71
New Jersey state court. The plaintiffs in Goodyear, the general
jurisdiction case, were the families of two North Carolina teenagers who
were killed in a bus accident in France who alleged that tire defects had
caused the accident. They sued Goodyear North America, as well as three
Goodyear manufacturing and distributing subsidiaries from Turkey,
72
France, and Luxembourg in North Carolina state court. In both
cases, the state courts upheld personal jurisdiction over the foreign
73
defendants.
By the time the Supreme Court was through with these cases, it had
produced a unanimous decision in Goodyear and a fractured, 4–2–3
74
decision in Nicastro. The Court’s twenty-year collision course with the
relatedness problem produced the decision paralysis in Nicastro and a
deceptively easy solution in Goodyear. I do not mean to discount the role
that numerous other doctrines and theories have played in perpetuating
the personal jurisdiction crisis, and thus do not offer relatedness as a
unifying theory and its resolution as a universal panacea. I do hope,
however, to revive a discussion of relatedness and the special roles that
the concepts of general and specific jurisdiction play.
1. J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro
J. McIntyre Machinery was incorporated in England, and its factory,
also located in England, produced industrial-grade machinery for use in
75
the metal recycling industry. J. McIntyre did not make direct sales of its
goods to consumers or end-users in the United States. Instead, like many
foreign manufacturers, J. McIntyre engaged an independent distributor
to sell its wares throughout the country. The distributor was based in
Ohio and marketed and sold the machines throughout the United States.
69

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
See supra note 3.
71
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786.
72
Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2850.
73
Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 594 (N.J. 2010); Brown v.
Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), rev. denied, 695 S.E.2d 756 (N.C.
2010).
74
Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2850; Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J.,
plurality opinion) (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas);
id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (joined by Justice Alito); id. at
2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan).
75
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786.
70
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As many as four machines were sold to customers in New Jersey,
76
including the offending metal shearer that injured the plaintiff. The
manufacturer directed sales and marketing efforts for the U.S. through
its distributor and attended trade shows in U.S. locations outside of New
Jersey. However, it did not make any direct sales in New Jersey, nor did it
77
have an office there. For six justices, these facts were enough to
conclude that New Jersey could not exercise personal jurisdiction over
78
the manufacturer.
The splintered opinion demonstrates the Supreme Court’s
continued decision paralysis on the stream of commerce issue. One of
the only clear things about the Nicastro opinion is that the Justices could
not agree upon any number of the theoretical underpinnings of personal
jurisdiction. Rather than coalesce around one or more legal or
philosophical principles, the Justices displayed very different visions of
what personal jurisdiction analysis should be. The plurality and
concurring opinions are divided in their approaches to the case at hand
and in their approaches to personal jurisdiction generally. They are,
however, united by a failure to consider seriously the problem of
relatedness in personal jurisdiction. Justice Breyer appears to be waiting
for an answer to a question where the answer does not exist, and Justice
79
Kennedy has wished the question itself away. For both, the perfect has
become the enemy of the good.
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, itself no model of clarity,
accomplished two things. First, it revived the principle of forum
80
sovereignty as central to the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Declaring
that “personal jurisdiction requires a . . . sovereign-by-sovereign . . .
81
analysis,” Justice Kennedy stressed time and time again that contacts
with the United States as a whole were entirely different from contacts
with New Jersey. So long as the defendant was targeting the American
82
market generally, it had not targeted New Jersey. He even carefully
reserved the question of whether it would be constitutional for Congress,
if it so chose, to designate the United States as a forum for personal

76

Id.
Id. at 2786, 2790.
78
Id. at 2785, 2791.
79
See id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I think it unwise to
announce a rule of broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-day
consequences.”); id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (“The defendant’s
conduct . . . will differ across cases and judicial exposition will, in common-law
fashion, clarify the contours of that principle.”).
80
Sovereignty theories embrace the adjudicatory and law-making power of the
forum as the primary basis for jurisdictional authority. See Spencer, supra note 14, at
640, 647. But see Redish, supra note 5 (critiquing sovereignty theories).
81
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789.
82
Id. at 2790 (“These facts may reveal an intent to serve the U.S. market, but they
do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market.”).
77
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83

jurisdiction purposes for cases pending in federal courts. Second, the
Kennedy plurality firmly rejected the Brennan stream of commerce
position, stating that it “is inconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial
84
power” and that “the stream-of-commerce metaphor cannot supersede
either the mandate of the Due Process Clause or the limits on judicial
85
authority that Clause ensures.”
Justice Breyer’s opinion, joined by Justice Alito, is decision paralysis
writ large. Underneath his equivocation about jurisdictional theories and
his quibbles about the suitability of Nicastro as a vehicle for announcing
personal jurisdiction doctrine, one finds a deep discomfort with the
concept of specific jurisdiction. An examination of Breyer’s opinion
reveals that he is so concerned with the potential future problems posed
by a generalized relatedness inquiry—an inquiry that curiously overlooks
the facts of the present litigation—that he ignores the role that specific
jurisdiction can play in grounding the relatedness problem and breaking
it into smaller, more easily answerable questions.
Although Justice Breyer concurs in the judgment, he is unwilling to
sign on to the strict formalism of the Kennedy position because he
“do[es] not agree with the plurality’s seemingly strict no-jurisdiction
86
rule.” He is equally unwilling to join the dissenters in either
wholeheartedly adopting the Brennan stream of commerce position, or
in explicitly endorsing the nationwide contacts theory, under which the
defendant “‘purposefully availed itself’ of the United States market
nationwide,” and “thereby availed itself of the market of all States in
87
which its products were sold by its exclusive distributor.”
Justice Breyer’s claim is that the Nicastro case fits so obviously within
previous precedent that the case can be disposed of on its facts. Breyer
seems to be consumed with regret that Nicastro was not an Internet or ecommerce case and begins his opinion with a pout:
I do not doubt that there have been many recent changes in
commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated
by our precedents. But this case does not present any of those
issues. So I think it unwise to announce a rule of broad applicability
88
without full consideration of the modern-day consequences.

83

Id. Compare Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) (arguing that “a
nationwide personal jurisdiction statute providing that a defendant located in or
having minimum contacts with the United States can be sued on a federal question in
any federal court in the country would be unconstitutional” (footnotes omitted)), with
Casad, supra note 27, at 1599–1606 (arguing that “nationwide personal jurisdiction in
federal question cases should be provided by Congress” and is constitutional).
84
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789.
85
Id. at 2791.
86
Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
87
Id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
88
Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Of course, having announced his reluctance to engage with the case at
hand, Breyer goes on to deliver a vague and ambiguous analysis of the
situation.
The refusal to engage broadly with the facts of Nicastro is, at one
level, baffling. Although the Nicastro facts do not contain the fancy and
new-fangled trappings of the Internet, they present a solid, ongoing, and
unresolved problem: When may a forum exercise jurisdiction over a
manufacturer who sells goods that injure someone in a forum state? That
goods are sold to end-users in a forum state by distributors or as
components of larger products is not a startling or a new fact. It was true
of the world in 1945, truer of the world in 1987, and will continue to be
true of the world in 2012 and beyond. Wishing that the case involved the
“realities” of modern communications does not change the need to
resolve an issue affecting how most products wind up in our homes and
in our workplaces. If the Court cannot generate a majority opinion with
the relatively cut-and-dry facts of the Nicastro case, it is rather difficult to
believe that it will be able to do so in other cases in the future.
Breyer’s desire to postpone jurisdictional decisions for an Internet
case also indicates a somewhat naive assumption that a case involving
“modern communications realities” will implicate a stream of commerce
situation like Nicastro at all. Internet cases will come in all shapes and
sizes—as questions whether a “virtual store” subjects certain businesses to
89
90
general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction, whether certain types of
blogging, commenting, or posting defamatory statements on the Internet
91
will subject a defendant to jurisdiction under the Calder effects test, or
how sales through e-commerce intermediaries might affect a distribution
scenario like the one in Nicastro itself. While the Internet and ecommerce present new challenges, it is unlikely that the Court will need
92
entirely new jurisdictional tools to accommodate these facts. Ignoring
these nuances allows Breyer to fantasize about a future of clearer
principles without grappling with present doctrinal challenges.
Beyond Breyer’s misplaced concerns about Nicastro’s suitability as a
vehicle for announcing personal jurisdiction rules, the opinion

89
Compare Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir.
2003) (finding general jurisdiction over L.L. Bean which operated a “virtual store” in
the forum state via its website), with Caiazzo v. Am. Royal Arts Corp., 73 So. 3d 245,
258–59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that there was no general jurisdiction over
business based solely on website activity).
90
See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451–54 (3d Cir. 2003).
91
See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); see also Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d
527, 534–36 (Minn. 2002) (applying a narrow version of the Calder effects test); Novak
v. Benn, 896 So. 2d 513, 517–20 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (discussing Griffis with approval).
92
See Stein, supra note 27, at 411–12 (suggesting that the Internet itself does not
pose new problems, but only highlights “some fundamental mistakes that both courts
and commentators have made in conceptualizing the nature of due process
constraints on jurisdiction”). But cf. Redish, supra note 61, at 605–06 (suggesting “an
Internet exception to the purposeful availment requirement”).
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demonstrates more generally that he has turned the stream of commerce
problem into a question that cannot be satisfactorily answered. Consider
how Breyer construes the opposing positions of the Kennedy plurality
and the New Jersey Supreme Court (and, by extension, the Ginsburg
dissent). According to Justice Breyer, Justice Kennedy offers “strict rules
that limit jurisdiction” while the New Jersey Supreme Court’s rule is an
“absolute approach” and an “automatic . . . rule” that “would permit
every State to assert jurisdiction in a products-liability suit against
any domestic manufacturer . . . no matter how large or small the
manufacturer, no matter how distant the forum, and no matter how few
93
the number of items that end up in the particular forum at issue.”
Having cast the two positions as polar opposites, Breyer sets about
showing why he believes the dissenter’s rule is unworkable. Noting that
“manufacturers come in many shapes and sizes,” he frets about the fate
94
of the humble Appalachian potter or the small Egyptian shirt maker. By
implication, he acknowledges that larger manufacturers might have
produced, sold, marketed, or otherwise “done” enough to be subjected
to personal jurisdiction in a forum state. Aside from these broad
generalizations, Breyer has done little beyond turning back the clock to
precisely where it was after World-Wide Volkswagen, leaving lower courts
and lawyers with little clue as to how close to a forum state is close
enough. It is easy enough to rally sympathies for a small Brazilian
manufacturing cooperative, or local Kenyan coffee farmer, but Breyer
gives no indication of how we should know whether the Appalachian
potter could be subject to personal jurisdiction in neighboring North
Carolina, in further-distant Florida, or in far-away California. This is
because there is no single, precise answer to the question, How close is
close enough?, and Justice Breyer would probably be nervous delivering
any answer on either side of the imaginary line for fear that, in future
cases, that line might be located elsewhere. His appeal to the status quo is
disingenuous, for in a world where due process reigns, no rule is almost
95
worse than picking the wrong rule.
The most notable feature of Justice Breyer’s hand-wringing is that he
seems to have lost touch with the concept of specific jurisdiction as a tool
with any utility in answering these questions. At one point he opines that
adopting the dissenter’s view “would abandon the heretofore accepted
inquiry of whether, focusing upon the relationship between ‘the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation,’ it is fair, in light of the

93

Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793.
Id. at 2794.
95
Professor Bloom has suggested that seemingly strict and rigid rules of
jurisdiction actually mask a more flexible approach crafted to allow the judiciary
ample space in creating jurisdictional doctrine. Cases like Nicastro show how easily the
Court has been fooled by its own rhetoric of hard and inflexible rules, when in fact,
“[p]ersonal jurisdiction is not some inevitable limit on judicial authority,” but instead
is “a tool of subtle pliability and quiet discretion.” Bloom, supra note 5, at 1000.
94
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defendant’s contacts with that forum, to subject the defendant to suit
96
there.” In fact, Justice Breyer’s view diminishes the role of the
relationship between the forum and the litigation to almost zero. As his
italics demonstrate, he is concerned almost entirely with the relationship
of the defendant to the forum. The litigation itself is an afterthought.
This is evident in his concerns about future defendants. While he spills
much ink wondering about the fate of a small and distant manufacturer,
he says nothing about what the lawsuits might be in which they are
potential defendants, and how those lawsuits might be related to the
97
forum.
Thus, Breyer’s concurrence is almost as notable for what it omits as it
is for what it discusses. The opinion is nearly devoid of a discussion of the
98
relationship between J. McIntyre’s contact and the lawsuit. Breyer
repeatedly emphasizes that J. McIntyre’s only contact with the state of
99
New Jersey was the “single sale” of the machine that reached the state.
Gliding right past the McGee doctrine that a single contact with the forum
100
can be a constitutionally sufficient minimum contact, Breyer concludes
that “[n]one of [the Court’s] precedents finds that a single isolated
101
sale . . . is sufficient.” Breyer thus seems to be more concerned with the
relationship of the sale to the forum than with the relationship of the sale
to the lawsuit. J. McIntyre manufactured and sold a large piece of highly
sophisticated and dangerous machinery, a machine that stood at the
center of the plaintiff’s lawsuit. In other words, the opinion does not
investigate why any increase in marketing or targeting short of a direct
sale into the forum state would change the relationship between this sale
and this lawsuit for the purposes of specific jurisdiction. Instead, the
reader is warned of unlimited jurisdiction over the poor potter at her
wheel with no consideration of what role the hypothetical manufacture,
distribution, and sale of her product would play in some unspecified
future lawsuit.
It is this failure that has led Justice Breyer down the path of decision
paralysis, finding himself in a place where he is looking for an elusive
“fixed ‘point’ between ‘unconstitutional’ and ‘merely undesirable’ [that]
102
proves impossible to find.” Having stated the problem in terms that can
never be answered to his satisfaction, he has marginalized the very
concept of specific jurisdiction that could clarify the terms of the debate.
96

Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204
(1977)).
97
See id. at 2791–94.
98
See Steinman, supra note 3, at 490 (“Neither Justice Kennedy’s nor Justice
Breyer’s opinion addresses this link between J. McIntyre’s own activities in the United
States and the purchase of the machine by the New Jersey company for whom Mr.
Nicastro worked.”).
99
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792.
100
See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
101
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792.
102
Bloom, supra note 5, at 1000.
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Both Breyer and Kennedy fear that the wrong choice of a jurisdictional
rule would result in an unacceptable violation of a defendant’s due
103
process rights. One wonders, however, how the failure of the Court to
provide any rule at all is any comfort to parties who should be able to
depend on the stability and predictability of jurisdictional rules in
104
planning their affairs. Lower courts are already split as to whether
Breyer’s opinion means that the Court has rejected the Brennan stream
105
of commerce position, or whether the Nicastro opinion is so narrow as
106
to have little application beyond factual situations nearly identical to it.
Some even have dropped rather unsubtle hints of displeasure at the
Court’s inability to reach a decision, stating, for example, that “McIntyre
107
has little to no precedential value.”

103

See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion); id. at 2791
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
104
See Rhodes, supra note 43, at 137 (suggesting that a “functional doctrine” of
personal jurisdiction would include “some measure of predictability”).
105
See Smith v. Teledyne Cont’l Motors, Inc., Civil Action No. 9:10cv2152, 2012
WL 10836, at *3–4 (D.S.C. Jan. 3, 2012)(“Thus, six Justices agree that, at a minimum,
the limitations of Justice O’Connor’s test should be applied . . . . Therefore the
‘stream-of-commerce plus’ test now commands a majority of the Court.”); Windsor v.
Spinner Indus. Co, 825 F. Supp.2d 632, 638 (D. Md. 2011) (“McIntyre clearly rejects
foreseeability as the standard for personal jurisdiction.”). Some courts have read the
case as rejecting the Brennan position as it would apply to a nationwide contacts
theory. Compare Oticon v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC., Civil Action No. 08–5489
(FLW), 2011 WL 3702423, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2011) (“[W]hether or not the
plurality’s strict rule is the de-facto standard for stream-of-commerce cases going
forward, there is no doubt that Nicastro stands for the proposition that targeting the
national market is not enough to impute jurisdiction to all the forum States.”), with
Eastman Chem. Co. v. AlphaPet Inc., Civ. Action No. 09–971–LPS–CJB, 2011 WL
6004079, at *18 (D. Del. Nov. 4, 2011) (“Justice Breyer’s opinion (along with the
three-justice dissent) suggests that intent to serve the national market, when coupled
with other factors, remains a viable basis for the exercise of jurisdiction under streamof-commerce theory.”).
106
See UTC Fire & Sec. Ams. Corp. v. NCS Power, Inc., No. 10 Civ.
6692(LTS)(THK), 2012 WL 423349, at *9 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 10 2012) (“The plurality
opinion . . . does not categorically foreclose the exercise of personal jurisdiction
based on a ‘stream of commerce’ theory.”); Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., Civil
Action No. 2:10–CV–236–KS–MTP, 2011 WL 6291812, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2011)
(holding that “Justice Breyer’s McIntyre opinion was only applicable to cases
presenting the same factual scenario as that case,” and “declin[ing] to depart from
the Fifth Circuit precedents holding that mere foreseeability is a constitutionally
sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the stream-ofcommerce theory”); Original Creations, Inc. v. Ready Am., Inc., No. 11 C 3453, 2011
WL 4738268, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2011) (“[C]ase law utilizing [the stream of
commerce] approach has been left undisturbed” because “the Nicastro Court does not
discard [it].”).
107
Ainsworth, 2011 WL 6291812, at * 4; see also Sieg v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No.
3:10cv606, 2012 WL 610961, at *5 (M.D. Penn. Feb. 24, 2012) (“In light of the failure
of a Supreme Court majority to adopt clearly one of the two Asahi standards, we will
continue with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ approach.”).
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Justice Breyer, however, is not the lone culprit in this jurisdictional
escapade. Justice Kennedy, by eliding the concepts of the relatedness of
the defendant to the forum and the relatedness of the lawsuit to the
forum into strict and probably unhelpful rules of sovereignty, has allowed
others’ attention to wander from the quandary of specific jurisdiction.
The dissenters, meanwhile, missed an opportunity to seize on the virtues
of specific jurisdiction to solidify Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce
theory into a workable and appealing doctrine. Some clues to solving the
mystery may be found in the Court’s Goodyear decision.
2. Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown
108
On some levels, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
109
succeeded where Nicastro failed. Nicastro, with its 4–2–3 opinion, did not
do anything to solve the persistent stream of commerce problem in
personal jurisdiction, and arguably left the doctrine even worse off than
it had been after Asahi in 1987. Contrast this muddled state of affairs with
the orderly and unanimous opinion in Goodyear, and it can be hard to
believe that the two opinions were the product of the same court on the
same day. The most obvious difference between the two cases is that
Goodyear is a general jurisdiction case and Nicastro a specific jurisdiction
case. These differences, however, also extend to how the Court perceived
and responded to the relatedness problem.
Von Mehren and Trautman’s terminology forms the starting point
110
for Justice Ginsburg’s analysis. The plaintiffs’ claims in Goodyear did not
involve “adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or connected with, the very
111
controversy that establishes jurisdiction.’” Thus, the North Carolina
court would need general jurisdiction over the defendants in order to
exercise personal jurisdiction. Having identified general jurisdiction as
112
the proper mode of analysis, the Court could proceed to analyze the
only relevant dimension of relatedness: the relationship of the defendant
to the forum. The bus accident in which the plaintiffs perished took
place in Paris, France, and the allegedly defective tires responsible for the
113
accident were manufactured and distributed entirely within Europe.
However, because the Court carefully delineated this case as one of
general jurisdiction, these facts are not used to distance the defendants

108

131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
See Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63
S.C. L. REV. 527, 528 (2012) (“I believe that the case will prove to be one of the wisest
and most consequential jurisdictional decisions in recent years.”).
110
Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
111
Id. at 2851 (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1136).
112
Id. at 2853.
113
Id. at 2851–52.
109

Do Not Delete

2012]

7/15/2012 4:40 PM

THE RELATEDNESS PROBLEM

889

from the forum state. Rather, Justice Ginsburg simply treats these facts as
114
irrelevant.
The Court then considered the relationship of Goodyear’s three
European subsidiaries to the forum. The Court held that, although a
small percentage of the European tires were distributed in North
Carolina, the subsidiaries did not have the sort of systematic and
continuous contact with the forum and therefore were not “fairly
115
regarded as at home” in North Carolina. Their connections to the state
were “attenuated” and “f[e]ll far short of ‘the continuous and systematic
general business contacts’ necessary to empower North Carolina to
entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that connects
116
them to the State.”
The unanimity in Goodyear thus extends beyond the holding and
even the reasoning of the case. The Justices have agreed on three distinct
fronts. First, they agreed on the terms of the debate: this is a case about
general jurisdiction. Second, they agreed on the issue to be resolved: this
case requires an investigation of any and all contacts that the defendants
had with the forum. Finally, they agreed on the answer : Based on their
business activities, the defendants did not have systematic and continuous
contact with the forum state and were not at home there. Because
Goodyear did not involve any contacts that were related to the lawsuit,
there was no risk of the pesky fact that part of the defendants’ contact
with North Carolina, no matter how small, was somehow related to the
117
plaintiffs’ misfortune. This cleared the way for Justice Ginsburg to view
the defendant’s contacts with some distance.
The opinion is not perfect. Going forward, one can expect further
debate and development in the lower courts as to what it means for a
118
defendant to be “at home” in a forum state. Other commentators will
119
address that issue ably. Thus, I will confine my comments here to the
impact that the relatedness problem will have on this analysis. Solving the
problem of where (and when) a corporation is “at home” will require
answering a version of the question, How close is close enough? The
Court has provided answers for the easier cases: a corporation that has its
114

Id. at 2851 (“Because the episode-in-suit, the bus accident, occurred in France,
and the tire alleged to have caused the accident was manufactured and sold abroad,
North Carolina courts lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.”).
115
Id. at 2854–58.
116
Id. at 2857 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 416 (1984)).
117
One arguable contact with the forum was the fact that the plaintiffs were
residents of North Carolina. However, this relationship between the plaintiff and the
forum is lawsuit specific and therefore not within the province of general jurisdiction.
118
See Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 K.U. L. REV. 549, 551 (2012) (arguing that
the Goodyear court “achieved consensus because it can be read in radically different
ways”).
119
See Stein, supra note 109.
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headquarters or major facilities in a state is “at home” there, as is an
120
entity that has organized under the laws of a forum state. An entity is
not at home when it does not have any operations in the state, and the
only sales of its products into the forum state are indirect sales that
121
represent a very small part of the entity’s overall business. At a certain
point, however, courts will need to confront the question whether
entities that make some direct sales in a forum state or that have smaller
numbers of employees or offices in a state are subject to general
jurisdiction.
A few features of general jurisdiction analysis increase the likelihood
that these inquiries will not result in total doctrinal gridlock. First, the
metric for relatedness is relatively clear and unidimensional. Courts will
need to address the relative volume of the various contacts, but with the
focus unclouded by the relationship of each contact to the lawsuit, courts
can systematically investigate the importance and weight of each contact
with the forum, and the combined impact of any and all contacts put
together.
Second, general jurisdiction analysis cast in these terms is a much
better subject for application of the rule and results to other cases. The
most obvious example is how courts can apply findings of general
122
jurisdiction to repeat players in litigation. If general jurisdiction is truly
general, a finding regarding the amenability of a business entity to
jurisdiction in a state in one lawsuit should transfer seamlessly to others.
To the extent that different judges can, and perhaps should, disagree on
the application of general jurisdiction to smaller entities at the margins,
appellate courts can take the opportunity to let competing holdings
develop in the trial courts and then resolve differences through appellate
opinions of cases where there is a solid factual record from the lower
court. The findings of general jurisdiction should also be easier to apply
across different defendants of similar size and contact, so long as the
courts writing the opinions follow Justice Ginsburg’s lead and are clear
about which contacts count and why.
120
Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54 (noting that an entity is subject to
personal jurisdiction where it is domiciled). The Goodyear decision does not appear to
disturb the understanding that, unlike the principal place of business for purposes of
domicile under § 1332, a non-natural person might have more than one domicile. 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). It also does not appear to dictate that the § 1332(c) definition
of principal place of business be determined by the “nerve center” test defined in
Hertz v. Friend for purposes of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193–94 (2010). But see Stein, supra note 109, at 538 (advocating a
definition of “at home” based on a singular “citizen-like affiliation” with the forum
state).
121
Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54.
122
See Lawrence E. Rothstein, The Myth of Sisyphus: Legal Services Efforts on Behalf of
the Poor, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 501 (1974) (“The large-volume litigant is able to
achieve the most favorable forum . . . [by] tak[ing] advantage of differences in
procedure among courts at the state and federal levels . . . to encourage assumption
of jurisdiction in higher courts.”).
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Third, these inquiries will be at their most useful if the courts let go
of the idea that there is a single, ideal, Platonic form of general
jurisdiction that will suddenly announce itself if the courts wait long and
hard enough. Approaching the line between “close enough” and “not
close enough” asymptotically is a perfectly reasonable exercise for the
common law development of the rule and its application to individual
cases. Thus, despite the vagaries of the “at home” question, Goodyear has
successfully created space for courts to define the contours of general
jurisdiction in a more organized fashion. More importantly, by speaking
with a unanimous voice in defining the terms of the debate, the Court
has shown a commitment to moving beyond decision paralysis, if only in
one part of personal jurisdiction doctrine.
The problem, of course, is that general jurisdiction does not tell the
whole story. Specific jurisdiction will continue to be an important part of
the jurisdictional story, especially if Goodyear has the effect of tightening
123
the boundaries of general jurisdiction. If the only way the Court can
avoid decision paralysis is to effectively excise the difficult relatedness
problem from the picture altogether, there is no reason to believe that it
will be able to move beyond the relatedness problem in specific
jurisdiction. Once the Court has chosen specific jurisdiction for its model
of how much of personal jurisdiction will be exercised, it must confront
head-on the questions of why and how the relationship between the
lawsuit and the forum state matter.
II. RETURNING TO SPECIFIC JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has come to a standstill on how to cope with the
stream of commerce problem in personal jurisdiction. Aside from
concluding in Goodyear that the Brennan stream of commerce doctrine is
124
insufficient for general jurisdiction purposes, Nicastro left the stream of
commerce problem mostly unresolved. In this Part, I call on the courts to
reinvigorate the concept of specific jurisdiction, to squarely confront why
a relationship between the lawsuit and the forum matters, and to
delineate how that relationship should be considered in personal
jurisdiction analysis.
As a technical matter, courts have not literally forgotten about
specific jurisdiction. If anything, specific jurisdiction has become so
125
pervasive that its existence is taken as a given. Currently, the Supreme
Court appears to treat specific jurisdiction as an uncontroversial premise
rather than a conclusion to be reached. Lower courts are also sometimes
guilty of this phenomenon, and “[i]n many cases . . . courts fail to

123

See Twitchell, supra note 7, at 680.
Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2854–57.
125
See id. at 2854 (“Since International Shoe, this Court’s decisions have elaborated
primarily on circumstances that warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction . . . .”).
124
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mention the specific/general distinction and relatedness.” Treating
specific jurisdiction as an uninteresting premise, however, can weaken
the very foundation of that premise, because “the assertion that suits
must be related to the affiliating conduct simply restates the issue, it does
127
not explain why this must be so.”
In Goodyear, Justice Ginsburg accuses the North Carolina Court of
Appeals of “[c]onfusing or blending general and specific jurisdictional
128
inquiries,” but, of course, this is precisely what went wrong in Nicastro.
Without a theory of specific jurisdiction to guide them, the plurality
appealed to more global notions of sovereignty and federalism to
vacillate between the importance of the connection of the lawsuit and the
forum and the contacts that the defendant had with the forum more
129
generally.
The first task is to recognize the analytical distinction between the
two dimensions of relatedness outlined in Part I. Addressing separately
the relatedness of the lawsuit to the forum does not diminish the
importance of assessing a defendant’s connection with the forum itself.
However, a specific jurisdiction theory needs a clear account of why a
defendant’s connection with the forum is important. Any robust specific
jurisdiction theory will need to “account for why some contacts are more
130
jurisdictionally significant than others.” If it is only important because
of its connection to the lawsuit, the connection between the lawsuit and
the forum must be clarified. If, however, there is some other reason to
value a defendant’s contacts (or lack of contacts) with the forum that
have only a tenuous connection to the lawsuit, then these purposes also
must be clarified.
A. Avoiding Abstract Relatedness Questions
Refocusing specific jurisdiction analysis requires more than simply
teasing out specific jurisdiction from general jurisdiction. It will also
mean that the Court needs to construct specific jurisdiction doctrine in a
way that avoids abstract relatedness inquiries. Abstract relatedness
inquiries occur when courts attempt to answer generalized questions
about how claims, parties, or lawsuits are related without prior agreement
on why those questions are being asked or how they should be answered.
The relatedness problem has been explored to the extent that it
intersects with similar problems in substantive areas of law, such as the

126

Rose, supra note 14, at 1557.
Perdue, supra note 4, at 543.
128
Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
129
This uncertainty extends to state court decisions as well. See Rhodes, supra
note 43, at 139 (“[D]espite the preeminence of the contacts analysis in jurisdictional
queries, confusion regarding the appropriate parameters of specific and general
jurisdiction plagues the jurisprudence of many states.”).
130
Stein, supra note 27, at 418.
127
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131

causation problem in torts. I would like to suggest, however, that there
is a particular procedural dimension to the relatedness problem, and that
attention to this issue is long overdue.
The relatedness problem in civil procedure occurs whenever a court
must answer the question: How common is common enough? This
question possesses the unfortunate quality of being both impossible to
avoid and nearly impossible to answer. For example, the joinder rules,
particularly as they are drafted for use in the federal courts depend on
132
whether claims or parties meet threshold of relatedness.
One only needs to take a few steps into the world of joinder devices
before encountering the relatedness problem. The relatedness problem
in joinder is easy enough to understand. If the purpose of joinder devices
is to package claims and parties for the fair and efficient resolution of
133
controversies, then one needs a clear sense of which claims and which
parties fit together. Several joinder devices rely upon the standards of
“transaction or occurrence” or “common question of law or fact” to
determine relatedness. The commonalities approach has not produced a
coherent standard or approach to the relatedness problem in joinder,
134
and judicial opinions applying the “transaction or occurrence” and
135
“common question of law or fact” standard are notorious for a lack of
coherence within each joinder device and across the joinder devices in
which those phrases are used.
136
Despite the repeated use of the “transaction or occurrence” and
137
“common question of law or fact” language, the definitions of these
terms are notoriously elusive. One judicial strategy has been to define a
phrase simply by reference to another standard. For example, a classic
definition states that claims arise from the same “transaction or
138
occurrence” if the claims bear a “logical relationship” to one another.
The “logical relationship” test gives about as much content to
131

See, e.g., Rose, supra note 14, at 1577–78.
See Effron, supra note 10, at 762, 770–73.
133
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 107 (1989);
Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the
Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 813 (1989); Mary Kay
Kane, Original Sin and the Transaction in Federal Civil Procedure, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1723,
1728–29 (1998); John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 707, 710 (1976).
134
FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a).
135
FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
136
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1)(A) (A claim that “arises out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim” is compulsory.);
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (Relation back of amended complaints is permitted under a
“conduct, transaction or occurrence” standard.).
137
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (permissive joinder); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)
(class actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (intervenors); FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (consolidation
by the court).
138
See Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926).
132
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“transaction or occurrence” as “purposeful availment” does to “minimum
contacts,” yet courts persist in using it as both argument and
139
conclusion. Another strategy seems, at first, hardly to be a strategy at
all: ignoring or brushing aside the scatter plot of seemingly dissonant
joinder decisions, the inconsistencies of which are explained away by
vague references to the need for broad judicial discretion in the case140
management context.
In my previous work, I have suggested that these and other variations
are not simply the product of fact-specific situations and discretionary
decision-making. Instead, they are the result of the failed commonalities
approach to joinder. In place of the relatedness standards, the courts
have developed shadow rules of joinder that loosely govern the standard
141
While courts have avoided directly
for various joinder devices.
addressing the relatedness question, one can still identify patterns in
joinder decisions. It is from these patterns that two shadow rules of
142
joinder emerge. The shadow rules demonstrate that some judges are
anxious to dispense with the commonalities problem and focus instead
on the more practical concerns implicated by the various joinder
143
devices. Joinder thus demonstrates that the relatedness problem is
nearly impossible to answer with a simple, easily identifiable, bright-line
rule. Because judges understand that the broad question, Are these
claims (or parties) related? is impossible to answer in a principled and
generalizable way, they have spurned careful engagement with the
relatedness problem as a whole.
This sort of decision avoidance is problematic, as are the shadow
rules of joinder it has produced. The shadow rules represent a large lack
of transparency in joinder decisions. The most obvious way in which
joinder decisions lack transparency is the want of a meaningful or
identifiable standard for “transaction or occurrence” or “common
question of law or fact.” The standards defining these phrases are elusive
and opaque. There is, however, another level at which these decisions
lack transparency: the veil of discretion masks a variety of deeper
underlying concerns. A decision that supposedly investigates relatedness
might actually reflect a court’s opinion on the desirability of certain
causes of action, on whether a defendant should be entitled to repose in
a given situation, or on whether litigating the claims of several plaintiffs
together would in fact be more efficient during motion practice,
139

See C. Douglas Floyd, Three Faces of Supplemental Jurisdiction After the Demise of
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 60 FLA. L. REV. 277, 291–92 (2008); Douglas D.
McFarland, Seeing the Forest for the Trees: The Transaction of Occurrence and the Claim
Interlock Civil Procedure, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 247, 262 (2011).
140
See Effron, supra note 10, at 769.
141
See generally Effron, supra note 10.
142
Specifically, redescription and implied predominance. For a discussion of
redescription, see id. at 773–789. For a discussion of implied predominance, see id. at
789–804.
143
Id. at 809.
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discovery, or trial. In other words, the commonalities approach hides
more nuanced concerns specific to each joinder device, but also hides
judicial sentiments regarding the relative desirability of certain causes of
action or feelings about groups of claimants. Judges might even dispense
144
with the relatedness inquiry entirely when it does not suit them.
Beyond the lack of transparency, the shadow rules have produced an
absence of predictability in joinder decisions—a state of affairs that is
particularly problematic for the joinder devices bound up with res judicata
and the associated values of finality, repose, and the ability to bring a
145
claim.
The good news about the shadow rules of joinder is that they show
that even if the relatedness question is impossible to answer at the
margins, this is not a fatal flaw because there are other questions with
answers that can supply judges with the relevant information to make
their decisions. That is, decision avoidance of the relatedness problem is
neither necessary nor preferable. The shadow rules of joinder have
emerged for several complex reasons, one of which is the poor fit
between the text of the joinder rules and the underlying purpose of each
joinder device. The purposes of compulsory counterclaims are not
coextensive with those of permitting the joinder of parties or the
amendment of complaints with otherwise time-barred claims. If joinder
rules were rewritten with targeted standards to better reflect these
concerns, then joinder opinions might begin to show a uniformity of
reasoning within the fact-bound and case-management-rich environment
146
in which trial judges work.
The commonalities approach to joinder has failed because of a poor
fit between the questions that the standards ask and the purpose that
each joinder device is meant to serve. Trying to give general answers to
the question, Are these claims or parties related? does not answer the
very real and often differing questions underlying each joinder device,
such as: Would it be fair to the defendant to prepare a new defense
to a new claim?, Would discovery be more efficient if these parties
are joined in a single lawsuit?, Will these causes of action have a
meaningful overlap in motion practice?, or Should the defendant be
required to bring its claim at a time and in a forum that the plaintiff has
chosen? In other words, relatedness itself is not what matters in joinder;
rather, it is the consequences of certain types of relatedness in certain
circumstances that matters.

144

For example, in Pendrell v. Chatham College, 386 F. Supp. 341, 344–46 (W.D. Pa.
1974), the District Court found that two claims were unrelated, despite arising from
nearly identical facts. This is a clue that even when the commonalities question is
technically answerable, it does not answer the concerns that underlie particular joinder
devices, in this case, Rule 15(c).
145
See Effron, supra note 10, at 811, 815.
146
Id. at 814–18.
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The lesson for personal jurisdiction is that courts do not do well
when they try to answer generalized and unfocused relatedness
147
questions. The current specific jurisdiction doctrine as articulated by
Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer in their respective Nicastro opinions
makes precisely this mistake. However, this also means that it might be
possible to right the ship of specific jurisdiction merely by asking good
and focused specific jurisdiction questions and without freezing at a total
impasse imposed by the search for the perfectly crafted theoretical
underpinnings for this basis of jurisdiction.
B. Refocusing Specific Jurisdiction Analysis
Just as I have advocated rethinking the rules of joinder to craft better
standards that fit the purposes of each joinder device, I would suggest
that specific jurisdiction analysis be subject to a similar refocusing of
standard and purpose. In other words, instead of asking the
overwhelming question of what it means for a case to be related to the
forum, courts should be asking why this case is related to this forum. This
will mean significantly refocusing the specific jurisdiction debate on
specific jurisdiction concerns.
A return to the basic premises of specific jurisdiction does not mean
that the Court has to promulgate a single, all-encompassing, and
definitive theory of jurisdiction. In fact, the search for a unifying theory
can be an unnecessary distraction, as it forces the Court to shoehorn
older (and possibly inconsistent) precedent into a unifying rationale
while simultaneously worrying about whether the theory can
accommodate an infinite combination of future factual scenarios. For
example, as Professor Stein has observed, some theories like the
“exchange” theory of purposeful availment, have “sidetracked the courts
into an empty analysis of jurisdiction based on whether defendant
148
received sufficient benefits from his contacts with the forum.” Concepts
like the exchange theory seem empty precisely because they are devoid of
what makes specific jurisdiction specific—the ties between lawsuit and
the forum. A theory that is focused on the defendant at the expense of
focusing on the lawsuit will inevitably come across as unwieldy and
overbroad.
Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on sovereignty is a similar red herring.
Although state power and sovereignty might ultimately be one legitimate
choice for the theoretical grounding of personal jurisdiction as a

147
The doctrinal difficulties inherent in defining the boundaries of a lawsuit are
especially apparent when a court must decide whether ancillary claims over which it
would not ordinarily have personal jurisdiction are part of the same lawsuit and
therefore might be heard under a theory of “pendant personal jurisdiction.” See
generally Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 1619 (2001).
148
Stein, supra note 27, at 418.
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149

whole, Kennedy does not supply criteria for distinguishing between
difficult specific jurisdiction cases. The reader hears plenty about the
importance of purposeful availment and targeting, but has no sense of
whether those activities, as connected with this particular lawsuit, are of
any importance, nor of whether different contacts in a different lawsuit
can or should be evaluated. Similarly, Kennedy does not make use of
commentary discussing the interplay of interstate federalism and the
150
assertion of personal jurisdiction. Several of these theories contain
detailed investigations of how a forum regulates a defendant’s conduct
through litigation, by ex ante incentives and signals or by ex post
151
enforcement. These theories demand that courts ask precise and
targeted questions about specific jurisdiction because they tie the power
of the court in a particular forum to the particular conduct of the
defendant, and then tie the conduct of the defendant to the actual
lawsuit at hand. What Kennedy’s opinion is missing, then, is not only a
justification of why sovereignty matters, but a justification of why and how
sovereignty and power should matter to the exercise of specific
jurisdiction.
All of this means that courts—particularly the Supreme Court—will
need to become more comfortable with a reality of specific jurisdiction
that has already emerged—that is that different types of cases will be
subject to different inquiries about relatedness. With regard to the
stream of commerce cases, the Kennedy plurality and the Breyer
concurrence have lost sight of why sending a defective product into a
forum state matters. Until that question is answered, general appeals to
sovereignty, power over the defendant, and undirected observations
about “purposeful availment” and “targeting” will continue to confuse
and divide the Court, as will worries about the fates of unspecified future
defendants in unknown future lawsuits, an unfocused concern that
results from a “pervasive . . . analytical framework” that is “uniformly
152
defendant-oriented.”
In a sense, the problem as currently formulated requires courts to
answer the following questions: In light of the fact that a defendant’s
product has found its way into the forum state, what is the defendant’s
relationship to the forum? Has it been “nudged across the line” from too

149

See Steinman, supra note 3, at 492 (“Many of the principles on which Justice
Kennedy relies are not fundamentally inconsistent with a more lenient approach [to
jurisdiction].”).
150
For an example of commentary discussing the interplay of interstate federalism
and the assertion of personal jurisdiction, see Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60
EMORY L.J. 1, 7 (2010) (suggesting that principles of horizontal federalism can supply
a useful framework for understanding personal jurisdiction). See generally Spencer,
supra note 14.
151
See Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 1449; Stein, supra note 27, at 416–24 (advocating
a regulatory precision theory).
152
Mullenix, supra note 25, at 364.
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attenuated to close enough? As we have seen, courts are not eager to
answer these generalized questions of relatedness that smack of a futile
exercise in line drawing. Instead, courts’ inquiries should be directed
toward discerning what is central and what is peripheral in a lawsuit.
There is a lesson here for how courts should formulate the problem.
Currently, there is a debate in the lower courts about how relatedness
should be defined. The various lower courts have provided differing
answers. Some courts require that the contacts should be sufficiently
“related” to the cause of action, while others require that the contacts
154
“arise out of” the cause of action. Still others have turned to standards,
155
such as a tort-like “but for” causation standard.
It might be, however, that these debates matter very little to the
ultimate shape of specific jurisdiction. The choice of “arise out of” might,
in theory, be a narrower exercise of specific jurisdiction than “related
156
to,” but the language is irrelevant if courts treat the standard as a
generalized relatedness question that cannot be answered in a
meaningful way. Just as “transaction or occurrence” has come to mean
very little, so has the “arise out of” and “related to” language failed to
gain much traction or prominence in the larger debates about
157
jurisdictional limits.
III. WHY NATIONWIDE CONTACTS MATTER
In Nicastro, the role of national contacts forms a major point of
disagreement between Justice Kennedy and Justice Ginsburg. Justice
Kennedy, firmly insists upon a “forum-by-forum” analysis, demanding
that jurisdiction is proper only when “a defendant has followed a course
of conduct directed at the society or economy existing within the
158
jurisdiction of a given sovereign.” Acknowledging that J. McIntyre did
in fact “direct[] marketing and sales efforts at the United States,”
Kennedy concludes that the defendant’s “purposeful contacts with New

153

Here I borrow from the Court’s now-famous language describing how
plaintiffs must plead sufficient facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The
recent pleading cases are another example of a quixotic line-drawing exercise, and
one that has been severely criticized in academic circles.
154
See Borchers, supra note 38, at 126–27 (noting different standards used by
lower courts); Freer, supra note 14, at 29 (discussing the difference between the
“related to” and “arising out of” standards); Rose, supra note 14, at 1577 (discussing
how courts assess the causal relationship between contacts and cause of action in
order to determine relatedness); Stein, supra note 27, at 442 (stating that courts are
unclear whether to apply a “related to” or “arising out of” standard).
155
See Rose, supra note 14 at 1568–70.
156
See Borchers, supra note 38, at 126–27.
157
See Douglas D. McFarland, In Search of the Transaction or Occurrence:
Counterclaims, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 699, 701 (2007).
158
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011).
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Jersey, not with the United States, . . . alone are relevant.” Justice
Ginsburg, on the other hand, embraces the relevance of targeting the
U.S. market as a whole, finding that J. McIntyre took “purposeful step[s]
to reach customers for its products anywhere in the United States. . . .
Given McIntyre UK’s endeavors to reach and profit from the United
States market as a whole, Nicastro’s suit, I would hold, has been brought
160
in a forum entirely appropriate for the adjudication of his claim.”
Justice Ginsburg prominently displays the fact that her conclusion is
a result of Nicastro’s status as a specific jurisdiction case, stating that the
defendant “surely is not subject to general (all-purpose) jurisdiction . . . .
161
The question, rather, is one of specific jurisdiction . . . .” Ginsburg then
carefully examines the relationship of J. McIntyre to the lawsuit, and the
relationship of the lawsuit to the forum:
The machine arrived in Nicastro’s New Jersey workplace not
randomly or fortuitously, but as a result of the U.S. connections and
distribution system that McIntyre UK deliberately arranged. On
what sensible view of the allocation of adjudicatory authority could
the place of Nicastro’s injury within the United States be deemed
off limits for his products liability claim against a foreign
manufacturer who targeted the United States (including all the
States that constitute the Nation) as the territory it sought to
162
develop?
In other words, it is the concept of specific jurisdiction itself that allows
Ginsburg to overcome the sovereignty hurdle placed in front of her by
163
Justice Kennedy. Ginsburg makes astute observations about modern
commerce, noting, for example, that “[t]his case is illustrative of
marketing arrangements for sales in the United States common in
164
today’s commercial world,” and that “McIntyre UK dealt with the
165
United States as a single market.” These facts, however, are only as
meaningful as the strength of their relationship to the controversy at
hand.
This is why Ginsburg’s emphasis on the details of the Nicastro lawsuit
itself is so important. Having stressed that the injury took place in New
Jersey with a machine manufactured by the defendant for use in any U.S.
166
Justice Ginsburg closes the specific
state including New Jersey,
jurisdiction loop, overcoming the perception that the activity has “a
159

Id. at 2790.
Id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
161
Id.
162
Id. (footnote omitted).
163
Justice Brennan’s Asahi opinion “discarded the central concept of sovereign
authority in favor of fairness and foreseeability considerations.” Id. at 2783 (Kennedy,
J., plurality opinion); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,
116–21 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
164
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
165
Id. at 2801.
166
Id. at 2800–02.
160
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ubiquity that defies geographical boundaries.” Just as defendant’s
contacts with a forum do not hew neatly to state boundaries, the
168
boundaries of the lawsuit itself are similarly fluid. The conduct and
events that lead to lawsuits are rarely confined to state borders. Indeed,
169
entire doctrinal fields, such as choice of law, are dedicated to this fact.
In future cases, courts should further sharpen this argument. When
courts stress that some defendants have directed their behavior at a
national or regional area, and this observation is unconnected from the
specifics of the lawsuit at hand, the consequences for future defendants
seem scary and unconstrained. It can be easy to lapse into Justice Breyer’s
mindset of projecting general jurisdiction fears onto a specific
jurisdiction case.
National contacts matter, however, not just because this is a modern
reality of how a defendant might relate to a forum, but because it is a
modern reality of how a lawsuit might relate to the forum. The contacts
that a court would consider might apply with equal force to a lawsuit
brought in another forum. Kennedy’s mistake is to conclude that this fact
170
diminishes the force that those contacts have in the forum at hand.
Ginsburg’s major insight is that specific jurisdiction transforms freefloating contacts with the United States (or a smaller region therein) into
171
meaningful minimum contacts with the forum.
If this project is to be successful, courts must begin to treat specific
jurisdiction as a conclusion rather than a premise, and to give the facts of
each lawsuit the respect they deserve instead of treating specific
jurisdiction as if it were an undifferentiated, residual category that is an
alternative to general jurisdiction. This path is already well trod, and
scholars such as Lea Brilmayer have already paid ample attention to the
167

Spencer, supra note 61, at 87 (describing problems with Internet jurisdiction).
See Jamelle C. Sharpe, Beyond Borders: Disassembling the State-Based Model of
Federal Forum Fairness, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2897, 2900 n.10 (2009).
169
For this reason, several commentators have suggested that courts raise the
prominence of choice of law analysis in resolving personal jurisdiction doctrines. See,
e.g., Perdue, supra note 4, at 562 (“[T]he most likely basis for any significant personal
jurisdiction limitation is choice of law.”); Rose, supra note 14, at 1564 (“[O]ne of the
major roles personal jurisdiction plays in American law is a backstop for choice of law,
[because of the] strong tendency to apply the law of the forum.”) (footnote omitted);
Spencer, supra note 14, at 659 (“Although the Court has consistently rejected the
relevance of choice-of-law analysis to determinations of personal jurisdiction, that
position will inevitably have to be reconsidered.”); Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process
Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485,
524 (1984) (“Perhaps the most important element of forum unfairness to defendant
involves choice of law.”).
170
See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790–91 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
171
Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Conceptualizing jurisdiction in this way
might alleviate concerns that the Brennan test would impose on defendants an
affirmative duty to “avoid jurisdiction.” See Stein, supra note 27, at 452. In other words,
any duty to avoid jurisdiction in a state only follows logically after the defendant has
taken affirmative steps to target that state by including it in a targeted region as a
whole.
168
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nuances of related contacts in personal jurisdiction. With serious
theories of relatedness in personal jurisdiction already on the table, the
time is ripe for courts to begin applying them in earnest.
To illustrate, imagine Company X, a manufacturer akin to J.
McIntyre. The United States as a whole is one of Company X’s targeted
markets. Its machines adhere to American standards, it has engaged an
exclusive distributor to sell its products in the United States, and
representatives from Company X have met with various industry
executives at relevant industry conventions in typical convention cities
such as Chicago or Las Vegas. Justices Kennedy and Breyer are
concerned that based upon these facts alone, Company X is now subject
to jurisdiction in all fifty states. These facts, however, are closer to what
one would expect from a general jurisdiction analysis.
The purpose of specific jurisdiction analysis would be to shift the
focus away from the defendant, once nationwide contacts have
established that Company X has indeed targeted the individual
173
jurisdictions where its products are foreseeably sold. A doctrine of
nationwide contacts does not end the personal jurisdiction analysis, but is
an invitation to a court to begin a second front of the relatedness inquiry
by looking at the relationship of the lawsuit to the forum. A finding that
J. McIntyre is subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey for a machine
sold in that forum and causing injury in that forum does not mean that a
court in Delaware could have permissibly exercised jurisdiction over that
case with the New Jersey facts.
This does mean that J. McIntyre is potentially subject to jurisdiction
in many states, but it is not subject to jurisdiction in the haphazard and
unpredictable way that Kennedy and Breyer fear. Rather, because each
incidence of jurisdiction is tied to particular facts of particular lawsuits that
have a connection with the forum, the defendant has an appreciable
connection with the forum that goes well beyond a mere failure to avoid
jurisdiction by barring its products from entering the state.
Moreover, the more one engages with the facts of a particular
lawsuit, the more judges can distinguish individual cases and find
limiting principles. For example, a component manufacturer whose
products are incorporated into products for myriad markets and whose
products bear no indicia that they are designed specifically with the U.S.
172
See e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 1455–58 (suggesting a standard of
“substantive legal relevance” for determining related contacts).
173
An Illinois state appellate court hearing a case post-Nicastro has already
indicated a willingness to interpret the decision to mean that “all the justices found
that distribution by an American distributor in the states could be sufficient to
establish jurisdiction, given the right set of facts.” Russell v. SNFA, No. 1–09–3012,
2011 WL 6965795, at *8 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 16, 2011), appeal allowed, No. 113909, 2012
Ill. LEXIS 754 (Ill. May 30, 2012); see also King v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 5:11–cv–
2269–AKK, 2012 WL 1340066, at *8 (N.D. Ala., Apr. 18, 2012) (holding, post-Nicastro
that GM Canada targeted Alabama when targeting the U.S. market because “if not
Alabama, what market does GM Canada serve?”).
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market in mind might fail a “nationwide contacts” test to begin with.
Additionally, a lawsuit involving a product in a jurisdiction with a very
weak connection to the injury might not be sufficient.
Conversely, a strong connection between the lawsuit and the forum
is not a substitute for any connection at all between the defendant and
the forum. Suppose a product manufactured by one of Justice Breyer’s
hypothetical local artisans is purchased in a local market and then taken
by the plaintiff to the forum state where an accident happened. This sort
of “unilateral activity” by the plaintiff is not affected by a nationwide
contacts analysis if the defendant never engaged in activity that would
qualify as nationwide targeting in the first place. If, however, the
defendant has sold products for use in certain geographical areas, such
as specialized racing boats that it knew consumers would use in New York
races, this fact of mere foreseeability should not be a barrier to the
174
exercise of jurisdiction.
There will always be cases at the margins of relatedness, and the
nationwide contacts doctrine does not dispense with these line-drawing
issues. I would argue, for example, that the facts of World-Wide Volkswagen
will always be vexing because the argument that a regional retailer should
be able to cabin its activities is just as compelling an argument as is the
fact that cars can and should be taken to far away places where they
might cause great damage to persons and property in another
jurisdiction. The goal is not to erase the difficulties posed by cases at the
margins, but to convince the Court that it can articulate a specific
jurisdiction doctrine that breaks down the relatedness question into
manageable constituent parts, and to further convince the Court that it
may entrust the common law development of the doctrine’s factual
borders to the state and district courts who hear the cases and develop
the record.
For this reason, I believe that an application of Justice Brennan’s
stream of commerce approach provides the strongest basis for moving
forward with specific jurisdiction doctrine for products liability cases.
Brennan’s doctrine is a favorable one from a jurisdictional expansionist
point of view—a perspective that I whole-heartedly endorse. Of further
importance, however, Brennan’s method is more analytically sound when
accounting for the relatedness problem in personal jurisdiction. The
stream of commerce doctrine treats the relationship between the
defendant and the forum and the relationship between the lawsuit and
the forum as analytically distinct categories.
This, ultimately, should be the purpose of dividing the “fairness”
analysis from the “minimum contacts” analysis as Brennan did in Asahi.
Ginsburg’s opinion achieves exactly this result. She does conclude that J.
174

See Dejana v. Marine Tech. Inc., No. 10–CV–4029(JS)(WDW), 2011 WL
4530012, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y Sept. 26, 2011) (interpreting Nicastro to mean that the mere
foreseeability under this fact pattern precluded personal jurisdiction in New York over
a Missouri boat manufacturer for an accident that happened in a New York boat race).
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McIntyre has minimum contacts with the state of New Jersey because they
have placed items in the stream of commerce that foreseeably could
175
reach and injure someone in the forum state. But, more importantly,
the analysis goes on to emphasize that the strong connection of the
lawsuit to New Jersey, and importance of the lawsuit both to the state and
176
the plaintiff are factors that strongly favor the exercise of jurisdiction.
An advantage of the Brennan rule, then, is to avoid asking the
177
generalized relatedness question that has bedeviled courts. Specific
jurisdiction, if taken seriously, should impose on judges a duty to ask
sharp and targeted questions about the relationship of the lawsuit to the
forum, instead of theorizing generally about the nature of the
defendant’s overall relationship with the forum state. In this way,
meaningful engagement with the concept of specific jurisdiction might
lead the Court out of decision paralysis.
The two-step analysis, however, must be meaningful. In commenting
on Nicastro and Goodyear, Professor Freer has observed that Brennan’s
approach places “an inordinately high burden on the defendant to
178
overcome” a presumption of fairness. Therefore, “the only realistic
option for a court wishing to reject personal jurisdiction is to find that
179
the defendant has not forged relevant contacts with the forum.” With
this caveat in mind, reinvigorating the fairness analysis will be most
effective when the fairness analysis is tied to the purpose and exercise of
specific jurisdiction in specific cases. Once it is given a precise
jurisdictional purpose, the fairness analysis can be directed in service of
specific jurisdiction analysis, rather than as an afterthought or a catchall
that effectively forces courts to “strain to conclude” that there is an
180
absence of minimum contacts.
CONCLUSION
The stream of commerce story in personal jurisdiction is far from
over. Although one can hope that the Supreme Court will resolve the
debate in the near future, the next round of the debate will come from
the federal district and state trial courts that must confront these issues
on a day-to-day basis. The Supreme Court has not given the lower courts
much meaningful guidance on how the stream of commerce question
should be answered. However, the lower courts might do well to show the
Supreme Court the ways in which this question is answerable at all.

175

See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2797–98.
177
A significant problem with the Brennan approach is that it might have put too
much pressure on the fairness aspect of the analysis without simultaneously demanding
that the fairness inquiry be taken seriously in many cases. See Freer, supra note 14, at 2–3.
178
Id. at 2.
179
Id. at 3.
180
Id.
176
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Trial courts, as the shapers and caretakers of the factual record, have
an opportunity to return specificity to specific jurisdiction analysis, by
emphasizing specific jurisdiction as a conclusion to be reached rather
than a starting point for unfocused factual analysis. Lower courts can
indicate to the Supreme Court that there are smaller and more salient
questions of relatedness that can and should be answered, questions that
pertain both to the relationship of the defendant to the forum and the
relationship of the lawsuit to the defendant and the forum. Perhaps, in
this way, the Supreme Court can confront a specific jurisdiction that does
not appear to be so general, and from there begin to emerge from
decision paralysis.

